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Abstract: Since the 2001 attacks on the twin towers, policies on security have 
changed drastically, bringing about an increased need for tools that allow for the 
detection of deception.  Many of the solutions offered today, however, lack scien-
tific underpinning. 
We recommend two important changes to improve the (cost) effectiveness of secu-
rity policy.  To begin with, the emphasis of deception research should shift from 
technological to behavioural sciences.  Secondly, the burden of proof should lie 
with the manufacturers of the security tools.  Governments should not rely on secu-
rity tools that have not passed scientific scrutiny, and should only employ those 
methods that have been proven effective.  After all, the use of tools that do not 
work will only get us further from the truth. 
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Recently, the peer-reviewed journal The International Journal of Speech, Lan-
guage and the Law yanked an article that unfavourably reviewed voice-stress-
analysis software.  This software analyzes a speaker’s voice, and its manufacturer 
claims that it can be used for truth verification (See the Nemesysco website at 
www.lva650.com and http://security.nemesysco.com/gk1.html).  Examples of its 
use entail airport screening (Moscow Domodedovo Airport, 2006) and the 
evaluation of benefits claims by social services (“Lie detector to target claimants,” 
2007).  The decision by the editorial board was prompted after the company 
manufacturing the software threatened to sue for defamation (Cho, 2009).  Such 
intimidation and censoring of academic discussion is alarming.  The real problem, 
however, lies in governments actually using these technologies. 
Since the 2001 attacks on the twin towers, policies on security have changed 
drastically, bringing about an increased need for tools that allow for the detection of 
deception. Potential solutions are primarily sought in new methods and 
technologies.  The US Department of Homeland Security funded the development 
of the Future Attribute Screening Technology (FAST; Barrie, A., 2008), a set of 
sensors that can remotely measure multiple physiological signals.  The US 
Transport and Security Administration introduced The Cogito, another device 
measuring physiological signals, as well as the Screening Passengers by 
Observation Technique (SPOT), where specially trained teams watch travellers for 
behavioural signs thought to be indicative of deception (Karp & Meckler, 2006).  
Meanwhile, the US Defence Academy for Credibility Assessment issued the 
Preliminary Credibility Assessment Screening System (PCASS), yet another 
device measuring physiological signals, to its soldiers in Afghanistan (Dedman, 
2008).  Non-US examples of widely used deception detection techniques include 
the use of the voice stress analysis software by British authorities (Cho, 2009), and 
Scientific Content Analysis (SCAN) as one of the worlds most widely used 
methods to detect deception from written statements (Vrij, 2008).  Besides well-
chosen acronyms, these methods have one thing in common:  They all lack 
scientific underpinning. None of them is supported by research published in peer-
reviewed journals. 
 
In absence of systematic research, users will base their evaluation on data 
generated by field use.  Because people tend to follow heuristics rather than the 
rules of probability theory, perceived effectiveness can substantially differ from true 
effectiveness (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).  For example, one well-known prob-
lem associated with field studies is that of selective feedback.  Investigative author-
ities are unlikely to receive feedback from liars who are erroneously considered 
truthful.  They will occasionally receive feedback when correctly detecting 
deception, for example through confessions (Patrick & Iacono, 1991; Vrij, 2008).  
The perceived effectiveness that follows from this can be further reinforced through 
confirmation bias:  Evidence confirming one’s preconception is weighted more 
heavily than evidence contradicting it (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979).  As a result, 
even techniques that perform at chance level may be perceived as highly effective 
(Iacono, 1991).  This unwarranted confidence can have profound effects on 
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citizens’ safety and civil liberty:  Criminals may escape detection while innocents 
may be falsely accused.  The Innocence Project (Unvalidated or improper science, 
no date) demonstrates that unvalidated or improper forensic science can indeed 
lead to wrongful convictions (see also Saks & Koehler, 2005). 
 
We recommend two important changes to improve the (cost) effectiveness of secu-
rity policy.  To begin with, the emphasis of deception research should shift from 
technological to behavioural sciences.  It is the behavioural sciences that can pro-
vide insight into the psychological factors underlying deception.  For example, 
many of the methods described above rely on the assumption that deception is 
accompanied by some kind of heightened emotional arousal.  The robustness of 
this link between deception and emotional arousal, however, has been criticized in 
the scientific literature for decades.  Consequently, it is not the reliable registration 
of stress that is cumbersome; it is the relationship between stress and deception 
that is a problematic starting point (Lykken, 1998; National Research Council, 
2003; Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2006).  This key problem is addressed by the 
behavioural sciences, and not by technology.  
 
Secondly, the burden of proof should lie with the manufacturers of the security 
tools.  Currently, the evidence for many of these tools relies almost exclusively 
upon testimonials or non-disclosed research performed by the manufacturers 
themselves.  This stands in sharp contrast to scientific practice and the recom-
mendation of the US National Research Council.  This council— distinguished 
scholars—concluded that research directed at methods for detection and deterring 
major security threats should be “conducted and reviewed openly in the manner of 
other scientific research.  Classified and restricted research should be limited only 
to matters of identifiable national security” (National Research Council, 2003, p. 
230; see also Bhattacharjee, 2006). 
 
The government’s task of protecting her citizens comes with responsibilities.  One 
of these responsibilities entails that decisions about matters with significant poten-
tial social or personal implications are based on informed quantitative reasoning 
(Smith, 1996).  Governments should not rely on security tools that have not passed 
scientific scrutiny, and only employ those methods that have been proven effective.  
After all, the use of tools that do not work will only get us further from the truth. 
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